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Carol D. Rasnic*

Federally Required Restoration of
Surface-Mined Property: Impasse
Between the Coal Industry and the
Environmentally Concerned
INTRODUCTION

Basic Legislation (FederalSurface Mining Control
Reclamation Act of 1977)
Upon Congress' passage in 1977 of the Federal Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act, I there was little resistance to the premise that, since
surface coal mining has definite adverse effects on our natural resources,
federal regulation of such activity is imperative. Some of the express
purposes outlined in the Act lucidly stated the unavoidable conflict between those persons concerned with protection of the environment and
those persons committed to the maximum and efficient production of coal:
1) to establish a nationwide program to protect society and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations; 2) to
assure that surface mining operations are not conducted where reclamation
required by the Act is not feasible; 3) to assure that adequate procedures
are undertaken to reclaim surface areas as contemporaneously as possible
with surface coal mining operations; 4) to assure that the coal supply
essential to our energy requirements, as well as to our economic and
social needs, is provided; and 5) to strike a balance between the protection
of the environment and agricultural productivity and the national need
for coal as an essential source of energy. 2 The purposes ring of altruism
but, in practice, have proven to be simplistically stated. The "balance"
at times appears like the legendary Holy Grail-virtually unattainable.
The Act provided that states could avoid total federal regulation by
securing approval of state reclamation plans from the Department of the
Interior's Office of Surface Mining (OSM). 3 In practice, however, many
states have encountered difficulty in obtaining the required approval. That
obstacle, plus the vertitable deluge of federal regulations, has generated
doubts as to the necessity for, or the advisibility of, stringent federally*Assistant Professor of Business Law and Labor Law, School of Business, Virginia Commonweath
University.
1. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. 11 1978).
2. See 30 U.S.C. § 1202 (Supp. 11 1978).
3. 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (Supp. 11 1978).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 23

imposed restrictions on surface mining activity. One criticism is that
Congress chose to draft regulations into the Act in legislative form, rather
of delegating the rulemaking function
than to follow the usual approach
4
to the regulatory agency.
This paper will attempt to align and clarify the opposing interests of
the environmentalists and the surface mining industry and to identify the
areas where their differences appear greatest.
LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE ACT
S. 1403, the purpose of which was to extend the time for submission
of state reclamation plans to OSM for approval, and, more substantively,
to reaffirm congressional intent that states have the primary authority to
enforce the Act, was introduced in Congress in 1979. 5 A fundamental
provision of the proposed amendment was the elimination of the requirement that states comply with 30 C.F.R. § 731 (1981). The bill, introduced
by Senator Mark 0. Hatfield, triggered an inordinate amount of support7
from the chief executives of the states where surface mining is prevalent.
Support for its passage came also from non-coal producing states, largely
as an affirmation of the principle that the states should be the ultimate
regulator in such areas. 8
The bill was approved in the Senate by a single vote. In the House,
the bill died in the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs when
Congress adjourned in 1980. No similar legislation has been introduced
as of this date.
LITIGATION: A CASE STUDY:
Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc. v.
Andrus 9
FederalDistrict Court Action
Challenge to the constitutionality of the Federal Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act came with the filing in a Virginia federal district
4. Paper presented by David S. Hemenway, Assistant Secretary and Assistant General Counsel,
Peabody Coal Company, Surface Mining Control Reclamation Act of 1977, ALI-ABA Conference
on Legal Issues in the Coal Industry, June 6-9, 1979, Arlington, Virginia.
5. S. 1403, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
6. The regulation contains some three pages of elaborate mandates and requirements for inclusion
in each state program.
7. Correspondence, Gov. John D. Rockefeller IV of West Virginia to the Hon. Mark 0. Hatfield,
July 6, 1979; Gov. John N. Dalton of Virginia to Mr. Hatfield, July 6, 1979; Gov. Dick Thornburg
of Pennsylvania to Mr. Hatfield, July 20, 1979; Gov. Bill Clinton of Arkansas to Mr. Hatfield, July
9, 1979; Gov. James R. Thompson of Illinois to Mr. Hatfield, July 16, 1979; Gov. Bruce King of
New Mexico to Mr. Hatfield, July 11, 1979; Gov. Arthur Link of North Dakota to Mr. Hatfield,
July 6, 1979; Gov. Fob James of Alabama to Mr. Hatfield, July 17, 1979; and Gov. Ed Herschler
of Wyoming to Mr. Hatfield, July 16, 1979, reprinted in S. Rep. No. 96-271, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess., 17-19, 21-22, 24-25 (1979).
8. E.g., correspondence of Governor Cliff Finch of Mississippi to Mr. Hatfield, July 12, 1979.
9. 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D.Va. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Virginia Surface Mining].
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court in 1979 of a complaint and motion for preliminary injunction with
respect to enforcement of certain provisions of the Act. The trial court
judge's interlocutory order enjoining enforcement of sections 502-5220
was reversed by the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals. ' ' The appellate court2
reasoned that the trial judge had incorrectly applied case law standards'
instead of the statutory prerequisites for such injunctions as expressed in
the Act itself, the latter containing more stringent requirements for the
administration of a regulatory statute. This action by the appellate court,
however, presented only a temporary setback for the petitioners, for the
district court, following a 13-day trial on the merits, issued the injunction
holding sections 515(d), (e) and 52513 violative, respectively, of the tenth
and fifth amendments to the United States Constitution.
Section 515(d) and (e), one of the most controversial sections of the
Act, requires a post-surface mining return of the land to its "approximate
original contour."' 4 The district court dubbed this "the most intrusive
practical aspect of the Act. "' 5 Recognizing Congress' purpose and power
in enacting the legislation in order to protect commerce and the national
interest, 6 the trial judge nonetheless held that the Act virtually divested
the Commonwealth of Virginia of its right to determine the appropriate
usage of its land and thereby to direct the economic development of the
state. The court pointed out that pre-strip mining value of southwest
Virginia coal land is $5 to $75 an acre, but such land is worth at least
$5,000 per acre after leveling, sometimes as much as $300,000 an acre
or $1,000 to $5,000 a front foot.' 7 Therefore, said the court, restoration
to its original contours reverts the land to its lower values. In addition,
return of a steep slope to its original contour is "economically infeasible
and physically impossible. The cost of production of coal is increased
up to seventy percent."' 8 The court felt the ultimate irony was that
restoration could actually result in environmental harm because of the
increase of sedimentation and, therefore, probable erosion from the unstable mass of a reconstructed slope. In holding that the Act operates " 'to
displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of
10. 30 U.SJC. §§ 1252-1272 (Supp. 111978).
11. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc. v. Andrus, 604 F.2d 312 (4th
Cir. 1979).
12. These standards were set forth in Blackwelder Furniture Company v. Selig Manufacturing
Company, Inc., 550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977).
13. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1265(d), (e), 1275 (Supp. 11 1978).
14. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(d), (e) (Supp. 11 1978).
15. 483 F Supp. at 433.
16. Id. at 431: "Surface mining of coal in the United States may involve the temporary or
permanent degradation of vast tracts of land, a problem greatly magnified by developing mining
technologies. If the land is not reclaimed in a manner that subjects it to future use, then the productivity
of that land is lost to present as well as future generations ......
17. Id. at 434.
18. Id. at 434.
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traditional governmental functions,' "19 the court held these portions of
the Act also to be in violation of the tenth amendment. The effect of
enforcement, the opinion concluded, was to render the mining of coal
economically and physically impossible and to prevent the state from
using land for other purposes, such as for airports, schools, hospitals, or
agricultural usage.
The fifth amendment violation found by the court resulted from the
restricted usage of land mandated by the Act and the consequent diminution in value, i.e., a "taking" without just compensation. Citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 20 the court found that, since the restoration
of steep-slope surface-mined land to its "approximate original contour"
made it "physically and economically impossible to mine the coal,'' 21
the requirement was tantamount to "taking" without compensation. Even
if restoration were possible, the court continued, such restoration clearly
and significantly diminished the value of the land. 22 The deprivation was,
therefore, not only of the most profitable use of the land by its owners,
but of any use whatever, since "[m]ountainous terrain is unusable for all
income producing activities unless it is level, which the Act is aimed at
preventing." 23 In relying on Pennsylvania Coal, in which Justice Holmes'
opinion invalidated a Pennsylvania statute which prohibited any mining
that would result in subsidence of structure(s) used for human habitation
and not owned by the owner of the coal underlying the structure, the
court referred to an improper exercise by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania of its police powers, which the Pennsylvania Coal court felt was
not "justified as a protection of personal safety." 24 The district court in
Virginia Surface Mining made no effort to distinguish between the respective state and federal powers (police powers25 and commerce clause
power) in using Pennsylvania Coal as authority.
The court also invalidated certain provisions of the Act as violative of
the fifth amendment's due process clause. These included the section
allowing summary cessation of mining operations without affording the
operator a hearing in the event the inspector deemed an "imminent danger" to be present 26 and the provision requiring an operator against whom
a civil penalty has been assessed to pay the penalty
in escrow as a
27
prerequisite to contesting the penalty or its amount.
19. Id. at 435 (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976)).
20. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
21. 483 F. Supp. at 437.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 441.
24. 260 U.S. at 414.
25. The case has been cited often in eminent domain litigation. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. U.S.,
444 U.S. 164 (1979).
26. 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
27. 30 U.S.C. § 1268(c) (Supp. 11 1978).
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Pending appeal, the United States Supreme Court stayed enforcement
of the federal district court judgment. One of the amicus curiae briefs
filed in support of the position of the original petitioners, the coal producers seeking to have the Act declared unconstitutional, was the work
of James Watt, now U.S. Secretary of Interior, in his former capacity as
chief counsel of the Mountain States Legal Foundation. His subordinates
at Interior later argued against the position taken in that brief.
Many persons believed that the district court holding, if affirmed by
the Supreme Court on the fifth amendment issue, would necessitate a
recomputation and reconsideration of the cost of attaining national environmental objectives. 28 This rationale takes into account the illimitable
cost of providing monetary compensation to those persons who, in compliance with the Act's steep-slope reclamation provisions, are precluded
from making a profitable use of the property in its restored state. According to this view, an obligation to compensate landowners would in
practice prohibit any comprehensive land use plans to protect the environment. 29
Supreme Court Holding
(1) The Majority Opinion
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court on June 15, 1981, unanimously
reversed 31 those portions of the district court holding that sections 515(d),
(e) and 525 violated the tenth and fifth amendments. The Virginia case
was consolidated for purpose of oral argument with Andrus v. Indiana,3 1
in which the issues were identical with respect to constitutionality. The
Indiana federal district court holding, however, also had held the Act to
be an unconstitutional exercise by Congress of its commerce clause power.
That court called the effect of surface coal mining on prime farmland
"infinitesimal or trivial," ' 32 thereby holding the "prime farmland" sections, 33 all of which closely regulate surface mining activity on such
areas, to be beyond the scope of Congress' power as set forth in article
I, section 8, clause 3 of the United States Constitution.
Justice Marshall's majority opinion affirmed that portion of the Virginia
district court holding rejecting the litigants' commerce clause challenge,
.the High Court applying the "rational basis" test 34 in determining whether
28. See, e.g., Samuels, Surface Mining: Wil! Supreme Court Precedent Be Reclaimed?, 19 AM.
Bus. L.J. 47 (1981).
29. Id. at 48.
30. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
31. Now Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
32. Andrus v. Indiana, 501 F. Supp. 452, 458 (1980).
33. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1257(b)(16), 1258(a)(2)(C), 1260(d)(1), 1265(b)(7), 1265(b)(20), and 1269(c)(2)
(Supp. 11 1978).
34. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 281.
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Congress had properly exercised its power. Similarly, the Court held in
the companion decision that the Indiana district court had improperly
substituted its judgment for that of the Congress in determining otherwise. 35 The majority strongly emphasized the narrowness of the court's
task in determining whether Congress' exercise of its commerce clause
power had been' 36proper. Once the court is satisfied that there exists a
"rational basis" for Congress' finding that an activity affects interstate
commerce, the role of the courts is reduced to determining whether "the
means chosen by [Congress] is reasonably adopted to the end permitted
by the Constitution.""
The Court differed sharply with the district court's finding that section
515(d) and (e) violated tenth amendment restrictions on Congress' exercise of its commerce clause power and interfered with the states' "role38
as a decision-maker in areas of traditional governmental services,"
including that of regulating the use of land within its borders. The majority
deemed the district court's application of the high court's holding in
National League of Cities v. Usery39 to be erroneous, since the Act is
not, as NationalLeague of Cities requires, regulatory of "States as States. "4
The Court based this conclusion on two facts: the steep-slope provisions
of the Act regulate the activities of private coal mine operators, not those
of the state of Virginia; and the state could indeed assume complete
regulation of such activities by submitting a proposal for a permanent
compliance plan to the Office of Surface Mining. Regarding the state's
contention that the latter, containing mandatory minimum federal standards, consequently results in regulation of the state's function by the
federal government, the Court invoked the supremacy clause doctrine of
allowable preemption by Congress of state laws regulating private activity,
urging that "nothing in National League of Cities suggests that the Tenth
Amendment shields the States from pre-emptive federal regulation of
-private activities affecting interstate commerce. ,,4
Perhaps the most consequential area of the Supreme Court decision is
that portion reversing the district court finding that enforcement of the
Act would result in a "taking" by the federal government in violation of
the fifth amendment's, "just compensation" clause. The only applicable
test, said the Court, is whether the Act "denies an owner economically
viable use of this land." 42 In an almost cursory disposition of the issue,
35. Id. at 326.
36. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
37. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 286 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U.S., 379
U.S. 241, 262 (1969)).
38. 483 F. Supp. at 432.
39. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
40. Id. at 854.
41. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 290, 291.
42. Id. at 296 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
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the Court stated that landowners are not prevented beneficial use of their
land, since the Act, rather than "categorically prohibit(ing) surface coal
mining. . . merely regulates the conditions under which operations may
be conducted." 3 The Court emphasized the absence in the Act of any
attempt whatever to regulate alternative uses, but, rather, the imposition
by the legislature of certain requirements before surface mining activity
is undertaken. The conclusion of this portion of the opinion raps the
procedural knuckles of the petitioning coal operators, since the record is
devoid of any efforts by them to request and obtain a variance from the
section 515(d)'s "approximate original contour" provision, 44 or to request
a waiver of section 522(e)' s45 surface mining restrictions. The failure of
litigants to avail themselves of either of these potential solutions46rendered
the taking issue "simply . . not ripe for judicial resolution. ",
The Court then addressed the lower court's holding that the "immediate
cessation" provision 47 violates the fifth amendment's due process clause.
This section vests the Secretary of Interior with discretion to order total
or partial cessation of surface mining operations if he feels such operation
violates the Act and thereby creates an "imminent danger to the health
or safety of the public, or is causing, or can reasonably be expected to
cause, significant, imminent environmental harm to land, air, or water
resources ...."48 A hearing on the merits would then follow. The Court,
conceding that the ordinary due process requirements include a hearing
whenever one is deprived of a significant property interest,4 9 concluded
that the summary administrative action provided for in section 521(a)(2)
fell within the "emergency situation" exception, ° since the protection
of the public and the environment are of "paramount governmental interest. '"' Regarding the district court's opinion that such orders may be
issued summarily despite the absence of objective statutory criteria, the
Court disagreed, comparing the relatively specific standards of the Act
and implementing regulations with the more generalized criteria of statutes
in which such summary action has been upheld. 5 2 Further, the majority
stressed the availability to operators against whom such orders have been
issued of prompt and expeditious administrative hearings and subsequent
judicial review. The Court further upheld the five-day maximum time in
43. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 296.
44. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(d) (Supp. 11 1978).
45. 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (Supp. 11 1978).
46, Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 297.
47. 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
48. Id.
49. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 299 (quoting, inter alia, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527, 540 (1981)).
50. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 300 (quoting, inter alia, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 667-680 (1974)).
51. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 300.
52. Id. at 302.
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section 525(c) 53 which allows the Secretary to respond to requests by
operators for temporary relief from immediate cessation orders. The district court had reduced the time period to 24 hours, but the Court found
no evidence that less than the five-day period was feasible administratively.
Lastly, the Supreme Court reversed the district court finding that the
"payment under protest" provision 54 pending appeal of a civil penalty
violated due process, since there was no evidence that the parties to the
litigation had ever been subject to any such civil penalties.
(2) The Concurring Opinions
In a concise concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger reaffirmed that
Congress may exercise its commerce clause power through legislation
only when interstate commerce is substantially affected.
Justice Powell's concurring opinion emphasized that the "taking" issue
must be determined on a case-by-case basis, agreeing that there had been
no "taking"in the instant case. He added a word of caution regarding
the Act's potential effects, querying whether the drafters of the "approximate original contour" provision had fully comprehended the likely economic prohibitions to surface mining which would result in areas with
hilly terrain.
Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion stated that Congress' commerce
clause power is not so broad as to be limitless, as he feared the majority
opinion suggested. Indeed, he regarded this particular exercise by Congress to have been "to the 'nth' degree" 5 5 of its constitutional powers.
The unanimity of the Court strengthened the Act most particularly on
the due process and tenth amendment aspects. The Court apparently has
indicated that any future claims that enforcement has resulted in a taking
without compensation must be scrutinized on a case-by-case basis and
will require more than a showing of diminution of property values.
Opposing Views
(1) The Environmentalists' Perspective
The Act has been called "perhaps the most comprehensive environmental legislation yet to be enacted." 56 The "restoration to its approximate original contour" provision 57 which had been struck down58 before
53. 30 U.S.C. § 1275(c) (Supp. 11 1978).
54. 30 U.S.C. § 1268(c) (Supp. 11 1978).
55. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 311 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
56. Grandis, The FederalStrip MiningAct: Environmental Protection Comes to the Coalfields of

Virginia, 13 U. RiC. L. REv. 455, 486 (1979).
57. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(d), (e) (Supp. I 1978).
58. Virginia Surface Mining, 483 F. Supp. at 433 (1980).
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the U.S. Supreme Court held it constitutional 59 has been criticized by
the coal industry as only aesthetically beneficial. Indeed, W. E. Guckert,
Director of Pennsylvania Bureau of Surface Mine Reclamation, after a
1976 tour of Virginia strip-mining sites, stated, "I have never seen such
utter devastation, exploitation and destruction of the land as I saw in
Wise County [Virginia]."' Environmentalists' response to this position
in the Congressional hearings which led to the passage of this provision
was that, irrespective of aesthetic effects, improper or inadequate reclamation has led to water pollution, safety hazards, and increased flooding.
Correlatively, they reasoned, proper implementation of this provision
would drastically reduce soil erosion and minimize water pollution, thereby
of wild
protecting all mine-site residences and establishing new 6habitats
1
life and trails deemed vital to the ecosystem of an area.
Much of the opposition has been directed toward the federal assumption
of the regulation, as opposed to state control of surface mining activities.
Was the federal effort necessary? Many states had attempted to pass
adequate legislation, some quite comprehensive. For example, the West
Virginia effort in 197162 was widely regarded as the strictest such statute
in the United States. 63 The Congress, after six years of intensive debate,
apparently was convinced that the need for federal action was imperative.
The Act itself expresses the reason: "surface mining and reclamation
standards are essential in order to insure that competition in interstate
commerce among sellers of coal produced in different States will not be
used to undermine the ability of the several States to improve and maintain
adequate standards on coal mining operations within their borders. "64 In
deeming federal regulation of surface mining necessary, Congress thus
viewed the natural urge of the states to shield their coal industries from
inherent disadvantages of competition as an impassable deterrent to their
passage of sound reclamation legislation. As Senator Morris K. Udall,
one of the bill's sponsors, has stated, ". . . without federal standards,
political reality militates in favor of loose controls. ",65 The feeling of the
majority in the Congress was that the need for minimum environmental
standards and uniform priorities for mining and reclamation was evident,
different that widely varying
since the states' various programs were so 66
standards were being applied in each state.
59. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
60. Grandis, supra note 56, at 455.
61. H. R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st sess. 80 (1977).
62. W. VA. CODE §§ 20-6-1 to -42 (1980).
63. Wooley,The ProtectionofHydrologicand Land PreservatoinValues Under the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: A Welcome Reform, 81 W. VA. L. REv. 627 (1979).
64. 30 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (Supp. 11 1978).
65. Udall, The Enactment of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 in Retrospect, 81 W. VA. L. REv. 553 (1979).
66. Grandis, supra note 56, at 458.
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Essentially, the statute provides a safeguard: it is prophylactic legislation, designed to prevent deterioration of the environment by actions
which, because of insufficient or hurried planning, have done more harm
to the environment than had been anticipated. Our inability to predict the
long-range effects of surface mining dictates that the industry proceed
with rational control so as to prevent unnecessary destruction.6 7
Perhaps the ills the statute was designed to prevent and, if possible,
to correct have been most articulately stated by Senator Udall in reconstructing the concerns by the Senate during the drafting of the legislation:
I do not believe I will ever forget the people-the citizens of
Appalachian coal fields, the farmers of the Midwest or the ranchers
of the Northern plains. They understand the nation's need to mine
and burn coal, but they are not so sure the nation understands what
bad mining practices can do to their communities and way of life.
For six long years these people expended their limited resources
again and again to come to Washington to tell their story. At every
opportunity during our field investigations they met our delegations
to point to the creek that once ran clear, to the mountain where they
used to hunt or to the road once safe for a school bus. These people
made an impact on the federal law, and those of us who
came to
68
know them believe that their influence should continue.
Passage of the Act was not easily nor perfunctorily achieved, and those
supporting it have voiced a very real and fundamental frustration with
previous inadequate controls.
(2) The Position of the Industry: The Need for Coal Production
The extraction of coal must be effected in a manner most protective
to our environment. However, the "balance" listed among the Act's
purposes69 must be remembered, lest environmental concerns strangle
the coal production essential to the nation's economy and energy supply.
In his March 16, 1978, address to the Houston Law Review Energy
Conference, Carl E. Bagge of the National Coal Association called coal
"the nation's principal energy reserve, a reserve that can and must be
67. See Wooley, supra note 63, at 628-29 n. 2 (quoting Harker, Suitable or Unsuitable-A
Question of Dubious Resolution, SyMposiuM, Surface Mining and Fish/Wildlife Needs in the Eastern
United States, W. Va. University and United States Department of the Interior Fish and Wildlife
Service, Dec. 1978):
"The incredible proliferation of our species and demand for resources has forced us
to operate far beyond our understanding, possibly at great expense to future generations.
The most important single concept of.ecology is that there exists a vast complex
interrelationship between all elements of our natural world. Not even the simplest of
natural systems is understood. The worth of maintaining our natural diversity cannot
be underestimated."
68. Udall, supra note 65, at 557.
69. 30 U.S.C. § 1202 (Supp. 11 1978).
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fully utilized.""° Bagge proposed that a simultaneous achievement of all
national objectives is not possible. He enumerated such objectives as: (1)
an adequate supply of energy to meet our needs at "affordable prices";
(2) an improved quality of the environment; and (3) a sound and healthy
economy, including full employment and a continual rise in our standard
of living. The recoverable reserves in the U.S. (coal in known locations
deemed mineable from an economic perspective utilizing present technology) are approximately 260 billion short tons 7' after having made
allowance for unrecovered fractions of 50 percent in deep mining and 15
percent in surface mining. 72 While 56 percent of the nation's coal production came from surface mines in 1976, 73 the reported present figure
is 662/3 percent. 74
The negative environmental characteristics of surface mining are countered, according to its proponents, by its more positive ones: e.g., it is
a safer method than the underground extraction procedure, and it yields
more miner-productivity. 7' These humanitarian and economic consequences must not be lightly discounted.
It should be noted that a further environmental obstacle has proven
harmful to the industry. Because of their reluctance to assume the necessary pollution control costs, coal's longtime chief consumers, electric
utilities, have limited their usage of coal, which has resulted in an overcapacity in the industry of 100 million tons per year and approximately
20,000 unemployed miners. 76 And former President Carter's proposal
that usage of coal be significantly increased is deterred by the provision
in the Clean Air Act 77 preventing significant deterioration of the air. This
legislation and its requirements for compliance further compound the
"balance" problem addressed in the Act.
Federal Regulations Adopted and/or Proposed Since
Virginia Surface Mining
The approach of the Reagan Interior Department, the parent department
of the Office of Surface Mining, has been under the controversial guidance
of President Reagan's appointee, Secretary James Watt, since 1981.
70. Bagge, Coal and the Nation's Energy Future, 15 Hous. REV. 1081, 1082 (1978).
71. A "short ton" is 2,000 lbs. See W. Rogers, THE COAL PRIMER 69 (1978).
72. Holdren, Coal in Context: Its Role in National Energy Future, 15 HOUST. L. REv. 1089,

1093 (reference to Committee on Nuclear and Alternate Energy Systems, Report of the Reserve
Group on Coal (1978) available from the National Academy Sciences, Washington, D.C.; U.S.

DEP'T OF INTlRIOR, ENERGY PERSPECriVES 2 (1976)).
73. Holdren, supra note 72, at 1105.
74. McKelway, Coal's Wounds Disclosed, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 11, 1981, at F-2, col.

3.
75. Holdren, supra note 72, at 1105.
76. Coal Industry Complaints Supported by U.S. Reports, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 11,
1981, at A-22, col. 1.
77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. l1 1979).
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Watt's pre-confirmation statement to the Senate Energy and Natural
Resources Committee gave insight into his views: ". . . (t)his country
must commit itself to a reasoned, environmentally conscious program for
developing and utilizing the tremendous energy resources our nation possesses. Unless we have such a program, economic, social and political
pressures will grow to such an extent that the federal government will
be forced in a crisis situation to mount a crash program to develop coal,
uranium, oil shale, tar sands and oil and gas. All too often, the federal
government moves in a crisis, not with the precision of a surgeon's
scalpel, but with the force of a meat ax. Those of us who love and are
committed to preserving the beauty and values of our environment, fear
this possibility. We want the right kind of development to come over
time, not the wrong kind of development to come in a crisis."7
He has indicated his responsibility as that of balancing the demands
of environmentalists with the demands of those persons concerned with
proper and maximum use of the land. Accordingly, he announced his
intent to reorganize OSM, reducing its staff from the present 1,000 to
600 employees. Indeed, as a move toward implementation of this plan,
he ordered the Denver, Colorado office closed August 31, 1981. Such
reorganization, according to Watt, will place primary enforcement responsibility of the Act with the individual states, as Congress intended.
Some of the regulations which have become final under Secretary Watt
are changes which came in response to complaints from state agencies
that the existing regulations did not provide sufficient flexibility for meeting the varying needs among the several states. The section setting forth
the standard for federal approval of state programs 79 was amended, 80
changing the wording of the standard required for a state's regulations
from "no less stringent than" the Act and the federal regulations 8' to "no
less effective than" the regulations of the Secretary. The so-called "state
window" provision 82 was deleted . 8 This provision had required a state
requesting approval of a proposed alternate procedure to meet certain
conditions, 84 including a showing that the proposed alternative is "necessary because of local requirements or local environmental or agricultural
conditions." '8 5 These changes unquestionably give the states more discretion in adopting a plan which OSM will approve.
78. The Watt Approach, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 13, 1981, p. A-8, col. 1.
79. 30 C.F.R. § 730.5(b) (1979).
80. 46 Fed. Reg. 53,376 (1981) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. § 730.5(b)).
81. 30 C.F.R. § 503(a) (1979) of the Act requires, in order for a state program to be approved,
that the state law be "in accordance with" the Act and that the state's rules and regulations be
"consistent with" those of the Secretary.
82. 30 C.F.R. §731.13 (1979).
83. 46 Fed. Reg. 53, 376 (1981) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. § 730.5(b)).
84. 30 C.F.R. §§731.11-731.14 (1979).
85. 30 C.F.R. §731.13 (1979).
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The section 86 allowing 90 days for abatement of a violation before
automatic issuance of a cessation order by OSM was changed to allow
a time extension when a permittee can show that timely abatement is not
feasible because of certain reasons. 8 7 One acceptable reason is that timely
abatement would result in more environmental harm than it would prevent.8 8 Among those proposed regulations8 9 which have not yet been
finally adopted, inter alia, was a proposed change of the regulation"
which requires a permittee to pay in advance the proposed amount of a
penalty as a prerequisite to contesting that penalty, or the violation in its
entirety. The Supreme Court in Virginia Surface Mining9 did not address
the constitutionality of this requirement, but the regulatory amendment
as proposed would allow a waiver of this pre-payment requirement if prepayment would prevent the permittee from continuing his business. 92 The
latest pronouncement from OSM on this subject
was another deferral of
93
any final rulemaking action on this subject.
There have been no changes, nor proposed changes, to the "approximate original contour" regulatory provisions. 94 The existing statute 95
and regulations 96 permit variances from the requirement in steep-slope
reclamation, if the variance will both improve watershed control of the
permit area and adjacent lands and also make the permit land suitable
after reclamation for "industrial, commercial, residential, or public use,
including recreational facilities." 9' 7 Such proposed use, however, under
the current regulation, must be "an equal or better economic or public
use" 98 than the pre-mining use. Some of Secretary Watt's easing of
restrictions, 9 9 if they are characteristic of his construction of the Act's
reclamation provisions and their implementation, may be forerunners to
a proposal drastically relaxing, if not eliminating entirely, the "approx86. 30 C.F.R. §722.12 (1980).
87. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,702 (1981) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. §722.12(e)).
88. Id.
89. Hearings were held on the proposals January 13, 1982, in Lexington, Kentucky; Denver,
Colorado; and Washington, D.C., with final date for submission of comments being February 1,
1982. See 46 Fed. Reg. 61,676 (1981).
90. 30 C.F.R. §845.19 (1979).
91. 452 U.S. 264. See also note 54.
92. 46 Fed. Reg. 58,464 (1981) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. § 845.19). Another alternative OSM
stated as being under consideration was an amendment requiring prepayment by all permittees only
with respect to proceedings occurring after an administrative law judge had determined a penalty to
be lawfully due. See 46 Fed. Reg. 58,468 (1981).
93. 47 Fed. Reg. 36, 632 (1982).
94. 30 C.F.R. §§ 816.101-106 (1979), 817.101-106 (1979), and 826.12(b) (1979).
95. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(d) (Supp. 11 1978).
96. 30 C.F.R. § 785.16 (1979).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. §730.5(b) (1979) and 46 Fed. Reg. 53,376 (1981) (tobe codified at
30 C.F.R. § 730.5(b)).
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imate original contour" requirement. Indeed, he has expressly stated his
plans to reverse the opposition of the federal government to mountaintop
mining. l00
As he perceives his charge, it is to "swing the pendulum back to
center"' 0 1 from an environmentalist position he deems extreme and impractical; he does not agree that such will effect a policy favorable to the
mining industry, but, rather, one committed to a proper maintenance of
the land for people to use. Often criticized for his somewhat fundamentalist religious concept, he expressed to the House Interior Committee
after his approval as Secretary of Interior that, although natural resources
should be preserved for future generations, one can only guess how many
generations will be born "before the Lord returns."1 0 2 His implication
was that perhaps it is not the intent of the Creator that we handicap
ourselves regarding present use of our resources by a futile attempt to
conserve what we cannot "take with us." Recent attempts to influence
the President to replace him' 0 3 are indicative of contagious feelings among
environmentalists that his position is not an impartial one.
CONCLUSION
Despite the escalating costs imposed by environmental regulations,
04
coal remains today "the cheapest of the fossil fuels on an energy basis."
Perhaps the only Utopian solution to the understandable conflict between
the industry and the protectors of our natural resources is a marked
decrease in our consumption of energy. However, the nation's energy
demands have in the past been consistently high; if such continues, the
deployment of every possible source will be forthcoming on a "crash
basis. "IS
Syndicated columnist John Chamberlain recently wrote of the "emotionalism" of environmentalists, further stating that alternative sources
to coal, such as hydrogen fuel, are met with "a mysterious combination
of hostility and indifference. "106
100. See, James Watt's Land Rush, NEWSWEEK, June 29, 1981, at 22.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 29.
103. Evans and Novak, The Campaign to Kill-a-Watt, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Aug. 11, 1981,
at A-15, col. 1. See also, Chamberlain, Sense and Nonsense about NaturalResources, Richmond
Times-Dispatch, Oct. 30, 1981, at A-14, col. 6, in which the Sierra Club's "Watt Petition Week"
of October, 1981, is reported. The organization had instigated an attempt to obtain a million "antiWatt" signatures to Congress. Apparently, the President was not influenced by this effort, since he
gave no outward indication thereafter of any displeasure over his choice for Secretary of the Interior.
104. Holdren, supra note 72, at 1094.
105. Id. at 1108. Mr. Holdren reaches the rather sobering conclusion that "[in the context of
the near-term and medium-term alternatives, coal is too good not to use."
106. Chamberlain, Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 26, 1980, at A-9, col. 3.
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Hopefully, leadership will provide the necessary paring down of the
burgeoning myriad of regulations, resulting in a reasonable extraction of
our energy resources, without an inordinate amount of harm to the environment. Jenkin Lloyd Jones recently expressed the over-regulation
problems thusly: "Uncle Sam has a legitimate role as policeman to prevent
misuse of everybody's heritage. But as a manager? Well, look at the post
office."' 1 7 Revitalization of a properly regulated coal mining industry
should result simultaneously in an economically beneficial "shot-in-thearm" to the mounting problem of unemployment.
It is not plausible that Congress' 1977 legislation was intended to effect
a near cessation of the strip mining of coal, but rather to regulate reasonably its devastating effects on the environment. The coal industry has
made unparalleled strides in efforts and expenditures to minimize environmental harm, and proponents of a complete absence of adverse effects
on the environment must realize the inherent risk in the production and
usage of the energy our nation demands and needs. Similarly, the industry
must accept the inevitable responsibility for preservation and reclamation
to the greatest extent practicable. The conflict is not irreconcilable, but
much negotiation and compromise must take place before a resolution is
imminent.

107. Jenkin Lloyd Jones, A Questionable Steward of Natural Resources, Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 4, 1981, at A-10, col. 1.

